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REVIEW ESSAY
European Integration: Past, Present,
and Future
L'EUROPE: GEN2SE D'UNE CIVILISATION.

By Lucien Febvre.* Paris:

Perrin, 1999. 425 pp.
THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE:
"DO THE NEW CLOTHES HAVE AN
EMPEROR?" AND OTHER ESSAYS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. By J.H.H.

Weiler.' Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 364 pp.
Reviewed by MartinA. Rogoff**
From its inception in the 1950s until the early 1990s, the
European Union (EU) was largely the creation of politicians, jurists,
and technical experts. Its effective sphere of operations was
confined for the most part to economic matters. The Single
European Act, which entered into force in 1987 and called for the
completion of the economic integration project by 1992, marked the
end of what might be termed the first, or economic, phase of
European integration. With the entry into force of the Treaty on
European Union (Treaty of Maastricht) in 1993, a second, or
political, phase of European integration has begun. Due to the
sensitive matters involved in this second phase of European
integration-such as justice and home affairs, common foreign and
security policy, and the creation of a common currency and a
European Central Bank-the people of EU Member States are
increasingly asking fundamental questions about the direction and
character of the European integration project itself as well as

* 1878-1956. Professor of History, University of Strasbourg (1919-1933), College
de France (1933-1956); founder (with Marc Bloch) of the influential journal Annales
d'histoire dconomique et sociale (1929); author of numerous books and articles,
including Le probldme de l'incroyance au XVIe si6cle: La religionde Rabelais (1942).

** Manley Hudson Professor of Law and Jean Monnet Chair, Harvard University;
Co-Director of the Academy of European Law, European University Institute,
Florence, Italy.
*** Professor of Law, University of Maine School of Law.
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seeking greater participation in EU affairs, at both the national and
EU levels.'
In addition to internal EU developments which have greatly
enlarged the scope of EU activities and impacts, recent changes in
the global and European political and economic contexts in which
the EU operates are posing important challenges for the EU and its
Member States and likewise have heightened interest and concern
among the general European public for a clearer sense of where the
European project is headed as well as for meaningful participation
in EU affairs. Some of these challenges include: how to compete
with the enormous economic power of the United States in a world
moving increasingly toward free trade; how to define and protect
European social and cultural values against erosion by pressures
coming principally from the United States and from multinational

corporations; how to define, protect, and promote European political
interests in Europe itself and beyond; how to react to the changed
strategic and political situation in Central and Eastern Europe in
the wake of the collapse of the Soviet empire and the disintegration
of Yugoslavia; and even how to restructure domestic politics in the
2
new, non-bipolar world.
It is important to bear in mind that during the first phase of
European integration, from the late 1940s until about 1990, the
political, economic, and moral climate in Western Europe was not
typical of much of the traditional European experience. 3
The

1.
According to Weiler: "[I]t is Maastricht and its aftermath ... [that have]
had a transformative impact: public opinion in all Member States is no longer willing
to accept the orthodoxies of European integration, in particular the seemingly
overriding political imperative which demanded acceptance, come what may, of the
dynamics of Union evolution." J.H.H. WEILER, Introduction: "We Will Do, and
Hearken," in THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE: 'DO THE NEW CLOTHES HAVE AN EMPEROR?"
AND OTHER ESSAYS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 3-4 (1999).
A recent example of the general interest in the ends and nature of European
integration is the Europe-wide debate provoked by the comments of German Foreign
Minister Joschka Fischer in May 2000 calling for the creation of a European
federation with a directly elected president and parliament. See Roger Cohen,
Germany's ForeignMinister Urges European Federation,N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2000, at
A6. See alsoAlain Griotteray, Contre une Europe d l'allemande,LE FIGARO (Paris), May
30, 2000, at 15; Europe: le d~bat Fischer-Chev~nement, LE MONDE (Paris), June 21,
2000, at 1, available at LEXIS, Country & Region (excluding U.S.) Library, Monde
File; Suzanne Daley, FrenchLeader,in Berlin, Urges a Fast Track to Unity in Europe,
N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2000, at A10; Da Chirac a Ciampi: la costruzione della nuova
Europa, 11discorso del presidente italiano a Lipsia, IL SOLE 24 ORE ONLINE, July 6,
2000, athttp://www.ilsole24ore.it/_ecoint/ciampiipsia/ (last visited July 7, 2000)
(on file with author).
2.
E.g., Martin A. Rogoff, Federalismin Italy and the Relevance of the American
Experience, 12 TUL. EUR. & CIv. L.F. 65, 65-66 (1997) (discussing the impact of the
end of the Cold War on politics in Italy).
3.
E.g., MARK MAZOWER, DARK CONTINENT: EUROPE'S TWENTIETH CENTURY (1998)
(describing the appeal and success in Europe of non-democratic, authoritarian forces
during a large part of the twentieth century).
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unique set of circumstances prevailing during that period greatly
facilitated European integration. Politically and strategically, postwar Europe was divided into two competing political and military
blocs. This situation put strong pressure on the Western European
states to cooperate in their self-defense, including close political and
military cooperation with the United States, and to cooperate in
other ways. Economically, Western Europe has experienced an
unparalleled and uninterrupted period of growth and prosperity
since 1945. More importantly, there have been no economic
downturns sufficiently serious to place severe pressure on the
democratic governments and the generally pro-European policies of
Western European nations. Morally, the tragic results of Europe's
second thirty-year war (1914-1945), especially the horrors of the
Nazi period, have continued to exercise a strong humanizing and
restraining influence on European politics.
Given the unique combination of circumstances which resulted
in today's integrated Europe, one might well ask whether the
movement toward further integration can be sustained, broadened,
or deepened in the face of changes in the political, economic, and
moral context that have already occurred, whose long-term effects
are not yet known, and of other changes that are inevitable. Will the
elimination of the threat from the East lessen Western Europe's
need or desire to cooperate in strategic or political matters? What
will result from inevitable future economic difficulties or crises,
rendered perhaps more serious and unpredictable by increasingly
global commercial, capital, and labor markets that subject states
and particular groups within states to world-wide economic
vicissitudes? Will the humanizing reaction to the events of the 19141945 period fade as those events become more and more distant
memories to future generations of Europeans?
We must not forget, however, that developments in Europe over
the past fifty years also have produced a new context, and have
given rise among Europeans to new identifications, perspectives,
and expectations, and also to entrenched political, economic, and
cultural interests. One may question, however, the intensity and
extent of these new conceptions and interests. Are they as visceral,
widely-shared, and motivating as the national and statist sentiments
and identifications that dominated Europe for 150 years prior to
1950? While not replacing national and statist sentiments and
identifications entirely, have European identifications and interests
served to create a parallel affinity pole, thereby at least sapping
nationalism of its virulence and of its potential for promoting and
justifying self-interested and destructive behavior?
As the European Union moves into the twenty-first century, the
people of Europe and their leaders face a number of important
choices-for example, choices associated with "broadening" and
"deepening" the EU, with the structure of EU decision-making, with
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cooperation in fokeign and security policy, with the problems posed
by immigration. In responding to these questions in general and to
the multitudes of specific, concrete, practical issues they raise on a
daily basis, what are the principles that should guide EU decisionmakers, national political leaders, and citizens of Member States?
What are the possibilities for innovative action in a given area, and
what are limitations that EU and Member State decision-makers
disregard at their peril? It is critical to sort out the important from
the less important and the unimportant and to establish priorities
among competing and complementary goals. To respond to all of
these concerns, some degree of common understanding and
acceptance of the long-term goals, possibilities, and limitations of
the European project is essential as a guide to decision-making,
planning, and establishing priorities. Moreover, as EU decisions
and Member State decisions affecting the EU will increasingly be
made on the basis of broad-based, democratic participation, it is
important that individual Europeans share this ability to take the
long-term, broader view with their leaders. In addition, for the
European project to move forward successfully, meaningful
discourse and debate concerning critical issues must occur at the
European-wide level as well as within each Member State. For this
to happen, Europeans must come to identify with the European
whole as well as with their particular Member State.
It is in confronting these fundamental issues and attitudes that
the European past may have much to teach, by providing a context
for the understanding and evaluation of future courses of EU and
Member State action, by providing a frame of reference for the
formation and articulation of EU policies, and by allowing
Europeans to determine or to appreciate the proper polity or polities
within which discourse and debate should occur. To perform these
functions, however, Europeans need to have an awareness and
appreciation of the common European past. The study of European
history, as such, must be part of the education of individual
Europeans throughout the Union. It is these two themes, the
historical past and education for the future, which come together in
the recent publication of a series of lectures, entitled Europe: Gen~se
d'une civilisation, delivered by Lucien Febvre at the College de
France in 1944-45, in the immediate aftermath of the liberation of
Paris.
In his lectures, Febvre considers the conception of Europe as it
developed and underwent change in meaning and significance over
time. His purpose in addressing these questions is pedagogical-to
provide a historical basis for the Europeans of his day, as they think
about the reconstruction of Europe after the defeat of the German
attempt at continental hegemony by the force of arms, to
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understand the transpiring events. 4 Febvre stresses that he is
s
dealing with a question of what he calls "historical psychology":
"history is what happens in man's head." 6 As for "Europe," Febvre
equates it with "European civilization," 7 which "is not a necessity of
place . . . or of race." 8 European civilization, like history, is a
psychological construct: "[it] is the product of human volition." 9
But "Europe" is not just an idea; it is also an organization. The
organization supports and gives permanence to the idea, while the
idea provides the rationale and justification for the organization.
The two advance together, or as Febvre puts it:
Europe is two things: an organization and a civilization. Europe
advances historically like a strong and skillful man in a dense crowd:
with his two shoulders .... Onel A push of organization. Twol A
push of culture, etc. First, a minimum of organization is necessary
to provide the fragile plant a first shelter. Then, in developing, it
needs a larger shelter, which in turn creates needs, [and] gives rise to
new enlargement .... Actions, reactions, alternating steps, progress
on two parallel routes, on two juxtaposed planes, the political and the
cultural. 1 0

Febvre looks at the European past through a telescope, first
training his vision on the distant past before approaching the
present, and seeks to convey, with a broad brush, the macrocosm
that Europe was and now is. Joseph Weiler, on the other hand, in
his recently-published collection of essays entitled The Constitution
of Europe: "Dothe New Clothes Have an Emperor?" and Other Essays
on EuropeanIntegration, looks at Europe's recent past through a
microscope, first focusing on the detailed inner workings of the
processes and institutions of European integration and then offering
his assessment of it all. The first, or pre-Maastricht, phase of

4.
LUCIEN FEBVRE, LEUROPE: GENtSE D'UNE CIVILISATION 87-88 (1999). One
might compare the post-1945 period in Europe, marked by the defeat of the Axis
Powers and the onset of the Cold War, with the 1990s, which were marked by the
collapse of Soviet power and the end of the Cold War. "The end of the Cold War
marks this century's third grand transformation of the organizing structure and
motivating spirit of global politics." Zbigniew Brzezinski, Selective Global Commintnme
FOREIGN AFF., Fall 1991, at 1, 1.
5.
FEBVRE, supra note 4, at 39.
6.
Id. at 41.
7.
Id. at 87.
8.
Id. at83.
9.
Id. at 83.
10.
Id. at 96-97. Febvre's characterization of the joint advance of the
European idea and political organization of Europe is remarkably descriptive of the
experience of the EU since its inception in the European Coal and Steel Community
in 1953. Advances in organization led to the broadening of perspectives, often
articulated by the European Court of Justice, which in turn led to further
organizational advances. These advances were then incorporated in subsequent
agreements, providing the basis for the further broadening of perspectives. Id.
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European integration, was, according to Weiler, the creation of "the
political class."
The population at large was hardly committed. But they were...
favorably indifferent .... There was no deep-rooted debate about the
Schuman Plan, about the Treaty of Paris or even the Treaty of Romeand this despite their many radical, constitution-like features. There
was no deep-rooted debate about the constitutionalization process,
that remarkable judicial dialogue, or multilogue, between the
11
European Court and its national counterparts.

Maastricht and the subsequent debates it provoked changed all
that. The European public is now "hearkening" to what has been
done,12 and "the current constitutional debate is not simply about
explicating the theory and values underlining the existing
constitutional order, but of redefining its meaning for a new
generation and a new epoch."' 3
Febvre directs our attention to the long view and to the big
questions; Weiler focuses our attention on the tangible
accomplishments of European integration and challenges us to
understand their significance for the present and future. Together,
the points of view provided by Febvre and Weiler are complementary
and provide an excellent context for thinking about exactly those
questions and issues that confront European integration today.

I. PAST
According to Febvre, the term "Europe" was coined by the
ancient Greeks. For them it was simply a geographical reference
Greek
with no cultural, ethnic, or historical significance.
civilization, through the Hellenistic period, and later, Roman
civilization were centered in the Mediterranean world, which
included part of geographic Europe, but also parts of Africa, Asia
Minor, and Asia itself. Europe arises with the collapse of the Roman
Empire,' 4 which resulted in the separation of East and West and the
Maghreb from the rest of the Roman world and in the admixture of
the Germanic element with the Mediterranean. I s The Carolingian
Empire is the first political organization of this new, European
world.' 6 It differed from the Roman Empire in that it was a

11.
12.
13.

WEILER, supranote 1, at 8.
Id.
Id. at 9. See also J.H.H. WEILER, Fin-de-Sikcle Europe: Do the New Clothes

Have an Emperor?, in THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE: "DO THE NEW CLOTHES HAVE AN
EMPEROR?" AND OTHER ESSAYS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, supra note 1, at 238, 256-

59.
14.
15.
16.

FEBVRE, supranote 4, at 88.
Id. at 98.
Id. at 110.
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continental-and not a maritime-power, that it was a rural
empire-composed primarily of peasants as opposed to mariners
and montagnards, and that it had a significant middle-class
component. 17 European self-consciousness arose and developed
primarily in Europe's continuous confrontations with Asia.
According to Febvre, "Europe made itself against Asia. [Europe]
tested itself against Asia. It was in its confrontation with Asia that
Europe made itself."1 8 The Crusades, a centuries-long enterprise in
which representatives from throughout Europe participated, played
19
a major unifying role, as did Europe's common Christian religion.
Furthermore, beginning about the year 1000, Europe experienced
a significant population growth, which led to increased economic
activity involving, importantly, the clearing of land and expansion of
agriculture, commercial intercourse, and the establishment of
towns. According to Febvre, this led to Europe's becoming what he
20
calls a "social reality" before it became a "political reality."
During the sixteenth century the term "Europe" entered
common usage. 2 1
The sixteenth century was the age of
Reformation, which resulted in the rupture of the unity of Western
Christendom. The idea of "Europe," glossed as it was to express the
Greco-Roman concept of humanism, became substituted as a
unifying idea, at least among the educated elite, for the former
unifying idea of Christendom. 2 2 At the end of the sixteenth and
beginning of the seventeenth centuries, the term "Europe" came to
express a "political" idea, that of the balance of power. According to
Febvre, Europeans felt the need at that time to define "Europe" as
a society of rival nations because of the contemporary threat of one
monarch establishing a universal dominion over all of Europe.2 3 In
the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century, a new notion'of
Europe emerged, that of the Europe that transcended the rivalries
among nations. As Rousseau wrote in his Consid6rationssur le
gouvemement de Pologne in 1772, "[T]oday there are no longer
Frenchmen, Germans, Spaniards, and even Englishmen, whatever
one says; there are now only Europeans." 2 4 Febvre sees the

17.
Id. at 112-14.
18.
Id. at 129. See also J.M. ROBERTS, A HISTORY OF EUROPE (1996)
(highlighting Europe's continuous confrontation with Asia). But see Jacques Santer,
Preface to WIM BLOCKMANS, A HISTORY OF POWER IN EUROPE: PEOPLES, MARKETS, STATES

(1997) (calling attention to the inclusivity of Europe and mentioning specifically Arab
contributions).
19.
FEBVRE, supranote 4, at 137-38.
20.
Id. at 157. See also id. at 152-57.
21.
Id. at 189.
22.
Id. at 198-99. See also JOHN NEVILLE FIGGIS, POLITIcAL THOUGHT FROM
GERSONTO GROTIUS: 1414-1625 (Harper Torchbooks 1960) (1907).
23.
FEBVRE, supranote 4, at 214.
24.
Id. at 229.
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Enlightenment notion of Europe, developed as it was primarily in
France, as a reaction to French setbacks in Europe and overseas.
It represented the desire of Frenchmen to continue their "dominant
and glorious position," but now as cultural and moral leaders of a
larger Europe. 2 S It is in this context that he makes the following
suggestive observation: 'When France is in peril, she does not seek
salvation by withdrawing into herself, but on the contrary in the
organization of a Europe which can surround France, amplify her
26
claims, protect her back, sustain and advance her ideas."
During the last quarter of the eighteenth century, Enlightenment
Europe, the "Europe above rival nations," cedes primacy to "la nation."
In Febvre's words: "[I]t was a shipwreck, the shipwreck of the vessel
There was in
of European illusions against the reef of the nation ....
France around 1770 a European mystique. There was in France in
Vhy? According to Febvre, the
1793 a national mystique."2 7
cosmopolitan "Europe" of the Enlightenment had become associated
with and supportive of the Europe of kings. "La nation" was a
"revolutionary force,"2 8 directed against the status quo of the ancien
regime and embraced by patriots interested in political and social
change. The idea of "nationality" emerges during the first part of the
nineteenth century, first appearing in the sixth edition of Boiste's Le
dictionnairede la languefrangaisein 1823. For Febvre, "nationality is
the constitution of peoples who have not yet reached the stage of the
nation."2 9 Nationality is a "virtual" nation; it expresses the unity of a
group of people who aspire to, but have not yet attained, their own
state.3 0 As is well known, the idea of 'nationality" as a conceptual,
organizing, and motivational principle, reached its apogee during the
first half of the twentieth century, totally eclipsing notions of European
unity. Febvre believes that the idea of nationality makes Europe
impossible; it leads to a preoccupation with race and with the claims,
31
memories, and disappointed ambitions of the past.
Now that the idea of nationality, at least in its extreme forms
and as the sole organizing principle for the organization of post-war
Europe, has been discredited, what of the idea of "Europe"? Febvre
calls upon his students to:
Remember the lessons from the lycde on French unity ... and its
authors . . . Louis XI, Henry IV, Richelieu, Louis XIV, . . . the
Revolution .... Europe is an extension of the process which unified

25.
Id. at 237-38.
26.
Id. at 238.
27.
Id. at 255.
28.
Id. at 246. See also EMMANUEL JOSEPH SIEYPS, QUST-CE QUE LE TIERS
STAT? (Roberto Zapperi ed., Droz 1970) (1789).
29.
FEBVRE, supra note 4, at 265.
30.
Id.
31.
Id. at 278.
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Europe is the dream of a super-state,
a state like France ....
grouping, encompassing, uniting all the states of Europe .... Europe
is the transposition onto a large scale of the process by which national
32
unity occurred in many European states.

He clearly rejects, though, the notion that European unity be
brought about by force, like German or Italian unity, but holds out3
3
the prospect of unity by way of "amity" and "free federation."
Although it would appear that the creation of a European state, of
which the present nations would be provinces, is "in the logic of
things" and "in the line of evolution,"3 4 Febvre questions whether
this is "a necessary step in the progress of humanity? Or should it
be skipped as not useful and even dangerous?"3 5 Would the
creation of a European state simply elevate the problems associated
with the concept of nationality to the global level, with a
"nationalistic" Europe pursuing its interests in opposition to the
other major political players at the world level? Febvre recoils from
that conclusion and in its place recommends that "old felt values
must be challenged, contested, eliminated, [and] replaced by
36
others."
What emerges clearly from Febvre's lectures is that the notion
of "Europe" has changed over time. Or as Febvre says:
Europe is a fluctuating name which for a long time hasn't known
exactly on which realities to settle. Europe, an equilibrium of powers,
an assessment of forces, a balance of rival states. Europe, an ideal
homeland, the ideal homeland of the liberal elites of the eighteenth
century. Europe, the enemy, the adversary of nations, especially the
French nation ....

the example and model of liberal countries ....

But how to create this Europe? Which rests on no reality, which
37
takes its reality from no precedent?

In effect, "Europe" represents less a definition and more an everchanging political or cultural agenda.
The nineteenth century was the great age of European history
writing. Niebuhr, Savigny, Ranke, Mommsen, and Treitschke in
Germany; Guizot, Thiers, Louis Blanc, Quinet, and Michelet, in
France; Macaulay, Arnold, Carlyle, Acton, and Maitland in Great
Britain, are only a few of the names associated with the flowering of
history writing during the period. 38 In most European countries,

32.
Id. at 143, 145, 146.
33.
Id. at 146.
34.
Id. at 291.
35.
Id. at 292.
36.
Id.at 311.
37.
Id. at 279.
38.
See generally G. P. GoOCH, HISTORY AND HISToRIANs IN THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY (2d ed. 1952). As Gooch points out, historical writing also should include
certain works of historical novelists like Alessandro Manzoni's I Promessi Sposi, which
"rested on a serious study of Lombardy in the seventeenth century." Id. at 401.
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historical study accompanied the revival of national feeling 9 that
occurred during the Napoleonic period and intensified during the
course of that century. It had, consciously or not, a decidedly
nationalistic political or cultural agenda.
Nineteenth-century
European history, as a rule, was nation-centered and emphasized
the uniqueness of the national experience, the national racial
heritage, or national cultural or spiritual achievements. Like the
writing of history, the teaching of history in European countries, up
through 1945 and still today for the most part, focuses on each
country's particular national history, rather than on European
40
history considered as a whole.
How do historians of today understand the European past? Are
they concerned with Europe as a whole? Or are they still focused on
national history? Efforts at the writing of Eurohistory have not as
yet met with much success. 4 1 At the outset, there is the question
of which countries should be included in Europe. Should Europe be
limited to EU Member States? If so, that roster has continued to
expand since the original six members and further expansion, of a
still to be determined extent, is presently under active consideration.
As expansion occurs, different historical, religious, cultural, ethnic
elements are added to the mix. If Europe is not limited to EU
Member States, the inclusion of other states (Eastern European
states, former parts of the Soviet Union, Turkey, Russia, even the
United States) 4 2 in Eurohistory partakes to some extent of a political
agenda, namely, that the included state(s) ought to be embraced in
the integrated Europe.
Norman Davies, who has recently written a massive (and highly
original) history of Europe, believes that European integration
requires "a sense of community" and a "spiritual home for those
millions of Europeans whose multiple identities and multiple
loyalties already transcend existing frontiers." 4 3 He quotes Benedict
Anderson's observation that "[all communities larger than the
primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even these)
are imagined." 44 It goes without saying that historians will have a
large role to play in the construction of any imagined European
community that may emerge.

39.
Id. at 397.
40.
NORMAN DAVIES, EUROPE: A HISTORY 32-36 (1996).
41.
Id. at 42-45.
42.
For Febvre's views concerning the United States as a part of Europe, see
generally FEBVRE, supranote 4, at 133.
43.
DAVIES, supranote 40, at 45.
44.
Id. at 44 (quoting BENEDICT R. O'G. ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES:
REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM (rev. ed. 1991)).
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II. PRESENT

One of the great difficulties in thinking and talking about
European integration is the competing descriptions of Europe which
often frame the discussion. Some see the EU as an embryonic
federal state, with a United States of Europe as the desired (or
feared) goal. Others see the EU as the Europe des ,tats, still a
closely integrated body politic, but one in which Member States still
retain essential elements of national sovereignty and national
identity. In truth, however, the EU is simply what it is. It is a
continually evolving (or, at times, devolving) economic, social,
political, and cultural space. Trying to characterize it as a particular
type of polity in quest of itself is vain and destructive to the reality
and dynamic that is the European project, and leads discussion into
fruitless, if not counter-productive, channels.
The Constitutionof Europe provides a healthy antidote to much
of the usual discourse. It foregoes conventional characterization
and seeks to describe the reality of the EU, not by likening it to
known and understood forms of political organization, but by
viewing it without preconceived conceptions or categories. The book
is divided into two parts: the essays and articles in the first part
"explain the structure and process of the European polity and its
constitutional dimensions as well as the dynamics of the emergent
European constitutionalism." 4s The second part of the book "is
about ends." 4" "It explores the values of European integration. It
explores the debate about ideals, legitimacy, and democracy in the
European Union."4 7 As a whole, The Constitutionof Europe provides
a picture of what the EU really is and how it got that way, as well as
an evaluation of what has been accomplished so far and a
consideration of future developments. It is not merely a collection
of previously published shorter pieces. The essays and articles
complement each other to produce a whole that is far more that the
sum of its parts. It is essential reading for anyone seeking to
understand European integration and to think about its future.
The first essay in the book, The Transformation of Europe,
originally published in 1991, is already well-known, and will not be
discussed here. 48 But it is significant that in that essay Weiler
echoes Febvre's concern that an integrated Europe might reproduce

45.
WEILER, supranote 1, at 9.
46.
Id. at 9.
47.
Id.
48.
For a review of Weiler's The Constitutionof Europe: "Do the New Clothes
Have an Emperor?' and Other Essays on European Integration, supra note 1, that
focuses primarily on this essay, see Petros C. Mavroidis, Lexcalibur: The House That
Joe Built, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 669 (2000) (book review).
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the problem of nationalism on a greater scale. "It would be more
than ironic," says Weiler,
[I]f a polity with its political process set up to counter the excesses of
statism ended up coming round full circle and transforming itself into
a (super)state. It would be equally ironic that an ethos that rejected
the nationalism of the Member States gave birth to a new European
49
nation and European nationalism.
Weiler fears that Maastricht's creation for the EU of the
accoutrements of the national state, like EU citizenship or common
foreign and defense policy, may lead to the transference of national
sentiment to the European level. But, in his view, other aspects of
EU institutional development represent other trends and
possibilities. Advances in the sphere of EU competence do not
inevitably entail commensurate losses in Member State sovereignty,
for Weiler does not see EU-Member State relations as a zero-sum
game. In an Afterward to the 1991 article, Weiler introduces the
concept of "infranationalism," which he sees as a central feature of
Community governance.5 0 "Infranationalism . .. is based on the
realization that increasingly large sectors of Community norm
creation are done at a mesolevel of governance. The actors.., are
middle-range officials of the Community and the Member States in
combination with a variety of private and semi-public bodies
players." 5 ' Weiler's infranationalism thus represents a new way of
describing and conceiving important aspects of the structure and
dynamics of EU-Member State relations that focuses on
contemporary reality while forgoing conventional categorization.
In his Afterward Weiler argues, recalling Febvre's "skillful man
in a dense crowd image,"5 2 that "there is a nexus between the two
spheres of politics and law where developments in one create a
climate, act as a catalyst, help sustain developments, and moves in
the other."S3
Weiler is concerned "that the current political
processes of Community governance offer a much less hospitable
environment for the continued development or even the sustaining
of the constitutional architecture. A new transformation is called
for."5 4
And this new transformation involves largely the

49.
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reformulation of goals and values and their acceptance by the EU
polity.
In the three essays that follow in Part I, the descriptive part of
the book, Weiler deals with the protection of human rights in
Europe, the external legal relations of non-unitary actors, and the
European Court of Justice (ECJ). Each essay offers fresh insights
and new perspectives. The essay on human rights, for example,
considers the appropriate polity, Member State or EU, for the
definition and enforcement of particular human rights. Consistent
with his desire that the EU not replicate pre-War statism and
nationalism at the supranational level, Weiler emphasizes what he
calls "fundamental boundaries"-those between the EU and its
Member States-and argues that certain fundamental rights
definitions and decisions be left to the smaller polities.5 5 His essay
on the external legal relations of non-unitary actors compares the
treaty law of the EU with that of a number of federal states, such as
the United States, Canada, and Germany. Weiler concludes that the
EU procedure known as "mixity," whereby both the EU and Member
States are required to participate in the incurring of certain
international obligations, is, in spite of its complexity and the
practical difficulties to which it may lead, on the whole, desirable.
"Mixity ...
expands the pluralistic posture of the Community's
external relations."5 6 Weiler continues:
In my view, mixed agreements, though not resulting in a further
exclusive building of the centre, may-by virtue of their capacity to
eliminate tensions and by constituting a growing network whereby
Community and Member States gain in international strength
simultaneously and become among themselves even further
inextricably linked-be regarded as a contribution to a strengthening
57
of the overall framework of European integration.

Mixity, although untidy both theoretically and operationally, thus
contributes to the new, and unique, form of political organization
that is the EU.
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Another example of Weiler's fresh view of classical
jurisprudential questions is his evaluation of the German Federal
Constitutional Court's decision concerning the Maastricht Treaty.5 8
From a strictly legal point of view, "the German decision is an
egregious violation of the Treaty . . . ."9
But, he argues, this
situation is not necessarily unhealthy. 60 He explains:
The German move is an insistence on a more polycentered view of
constitutional adjudication and will eventually force a more even
conversation between the European Court and its national
constitutional counterparts ....
There has been no constitutional
convention in Europe. European constitutionalism must depend on
a common-law type rationale, one which draws on and integrates the
national constitutional orders.
The constitutional discourse in
Europe must be conceived as a conversation of many actors in a
constitutional interpretative community, rather than a hierarchical
61
structure with the ECJ at the top.

He then goes on to suggest the creation of an EU Constitutional
Council, comprised of members of the ECJ and national
constitutional courts, which would have jurisdiction over issues of
62
competence (including subsidiarity).
The history of EU constitutionalism, including the developments
described in the first part of The Constitution of Europe, is not simply
"history" but, as Weiler puts it, "an intellectual history and discourse
of conceptualization and imagination." 63
As such, it bears
importantly on the ends of European integration and its motivating
ideals. Weiler considers ends and ideals in the perceptive and
sobering essay Fin-de-Si~cle Europe: Do the New Clothes Have an
Emperor?, which first appeared in 1995. He concludes that the
ideals that underlay the founding and subsequent development of
an integrated Europe-peace, prosperity, and supranationalism-no
longer retain their vitality. In fact, writes Weiler, the current crisis
of ideals may be considerably more serious:
Eerily, at the end of the century, the European Union can be seen
as replicating, in reality or in the subjective perception of individuals
and societies, some of these very same features [that marked the turn
to fascism in Italy, France, and Germany at the beginning of the
century]: [Ilt has come to symbolize, unjustly perhaps, the epitome of
bureaucratization and, likewise, the epitome of centralization ....
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The single market, with its emphasis on competitiveness and the
transnational movement of goods can be perceived as a latter-day
thrust at the increased commodification of values . . . and
depersonalization of, this time, the national market . . . . I am
suggesting that the crisis of ends.., might be [a] ... connection to
another worrisome past .... 64

But, Weiler concludes, "The Community is not doomed nor even
fatally wounded. And its ability to rebound from crisis is part of its
history ....
Europe would, however, be better served if the current
debate about its future addressed not only means but ends too." 65
In the last essay in The Constitutionof Europe, entitled To Be a
European Citizen: Eros and Civilization, Weiler considers the
"challenging tensions between national consciousness and
multicultural sensibility.... " 6 6 He envisions the "decoupling of
nationality and citizenship," leading to "the possibility . . . of
thinking of co-existing multiple demoi." 67 Weiler states:
The national is Eros: [R]eaching back to the pre-modern, appealing
to the heart with a grasp on our emotions, and evocative of the
romantic vision of creative social organization as well as responding
to our existential yearning for a meaning located in time and space.
The nation, through its myths, provides a past and a future. And it
is always a history and a destiny in a place, in a territory, a narrative
that is fluid and fixed at the same time ....
The supranational is
civilization: [Cjonfidently modernist, appealing to the rational within
us and to Enlightenment neo-classical humanism, taming that
68
Eros.

III. FUTURE

It is here, in defining the relationship between "national
consciousness" and a European "multicultural sensibility" that
Europe's past (its history), present (today's decisions and debates),
and future (the education of its young) come together. European
integration and the relationship between and among European
peoples today raise new questions, evoke new concerns, give rise to
new interests, and present new possibilities. The writing of history
and the teaching of history must be done in full consciousness of
the progress of European integration to date. Old divisions and
contentions, while still an ineffaceable part of the European past,
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must be seen and presented in the light of the present consensus in
favor of European integration, which is, after all, also a product of
the European past. The future, as well as the past, as Febvre
recognized, "is what happens in man's head."6 9 For the European
project to have a salutary future, historians and educators must
create and present the images and symbols of Europe that are true
to its past, responsive to the present, and evocative of a desirable,
inspiring, and realistically attainable future.
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